This article examines the ideological implications of different interpretations of the statement "Humans are animals. " It contrasts theories that regard humans as literally sophisticated animals with those who interpret the statement metaphorically. Sociobiological theories, bolstered by metaphors in the dictionary of English emphasize competitiveness and aggression as features shared by humans and nonhuman animals. Other theories emphasize symbiosis and cooperation. Some of these theories are prescriptivemetaphor patterns in English reflect the strong tendency to regard animal behavior as something for humans to avoid. Conversely, sociobiologists suggest it is natural and right to behave like animals, the naturalistic fallacy. Other cultural theories suggest that the statement is only metaphorical; our differences from animals are what make us most human. The article notes the tendency to metaphorically project the values and structures of current human society onto the animals being studied, serving the interest of those who, in power, benefit from the status quo.
Unlike original metaphors, conventional metaphors do not unsettle our modes of perception, feeling, or action, since they have achieved currency as an acceptable way of constructing, conceptualizing, and interacting with reality.
We no longer take much notice, for example, when someone says of an argument "I don't buy that," since buy is now a conventional metaphor with a meaning something like "accept, agree with." The fact that it has become current means that it works to convey a latent ideology that ideas and beliefs are a commodity, which we choose and shop around for according to our needs or desires. However, as we shall see, when looking at the pejorative animal metaphors for humans, metaphorical effects are not limited to the conceptual. They also have emotional force, which makes them value-laden and ideologically attitudinal.
One argument in this article is that metaphorical and other interpretations of HUMAN IS ANIMAL construct and reproduce ideologies and justify or reproduce certain behaviors (Fairclough, 1989 , Gibbs 1999a . I wish to raise awareness of these latent ideologies, and of how they may be structuring and influencing our attitudes and behavior toward animals and our fellow humans.
Interpreting the HUMAN IS ANIMAL Metaphor
What are the possible interpretations of the theme HUMAN IS ANIMAL or, taking an example from Morris (1967) the statement "humans are naked apes"? (p. 9).This might receive a literal interpretation, as a hyponymic statement, 'Humans are one kind of ape.' This view suggests that what we share with animals is much more important than what we don't share. Or we might opt for various kinds of metaphorical interpretation. Depending on one's beliefs and ideology, one might see more or fewer Grounds of similarity between the Target (humans) and the Source (animals/apes). So if one were to see many salient and important Grounds the metaphor would, perhaps, approximate to a literal statement, paraphrased, "Humans are more or less animals/apes." At the other extreme the differences would be more important than the similarities so the interpretation would be 'Humans are in a few minor respects similar to animals/apes.' Human nature could be much more dependent on culture, society, discourse, language, symbolism, indeed, metaphor itself. There are, of course, various mid-points between these two extremes. So there are at least three interpretations of "humans are animals."
Humans are one kind of animal; Humans are more or less animals; Humans are not animals but are in some/few respects like animals.
However, there are two complications to this scheme. Although one may agree that there are important similarities between humans and animals, one may disagree about what these similarities are. Some zoologists see animals as fiercely competitive and aggressive and evolution as based upon the struggle for existence, whereas others put much more stress on the symbiotic nature of evolution. Secondly, such statements can be expressions of desirability and idealism, rather than of a perceived reality. HUMAN IS ANIMAL might, for example, give us the interpretation 'Human is ideally in only a few minor respects like an animal'. We will present the metaphorical evidence that it has been common in Western thought to regard humans behaving like animals as reprehensible. But the idealistic view can also be associated with the other positions too: 'Humans are ideally like animals.' This is known as the "naturalistic fallacy," the idea that what is true must also be good.
This article begins with theories at the hyponymic or literal statement end of the spectrum, first those that stress grounds of competitiveness and aggression, which often seem to project features of human society on to animals, and then those that give equal weight to co-operativeness. Next we consider the lexical evidence in English of the traditional idea that humans are ideally different ideally different from animals. Finally we sketch theories that claim that humans are very different from animals, because of language and culture.
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Human as a Kind of Animal or More or Less Animal-Selfish, Competitive, and Aggressive Laland and Brown in Sense and nonsense (2002) give a table summarizing the various attempts within zoology and evolutionary social theory to impose MAN IS ANIMAL as a more or less literal hyponymic statement. All these approaches regard humans as sophisticated animals.
In sociobiology, from which most of these theories stem, humans are simply sophisticated animals. It follows that animal behavior is natural to humans, and socio-biology generally regards it as competitive and aggressive. Lorenz in On aggression (1963) claimed that "fighting and war are the natural expression of human instinctive aggression" (quoted in Laland and Brown, 2002, p. 60) . Thornhill and Palmer, in The natural history of rape, suggest that "rape . . .
should be viewed as a natural, biological phenomenon that is a product of the human evolutionary heritage" (quoted in Ryan, 2002, p. 254 Wrangham and Peterson (1996) find a natural inclination of the human male to be aggressive-to be "demonic." This inclination is "written in the molecular chemistry of DNA" (p. 63).
This emphasis on competitiveness, if not aggression, runs through many theories in Table 1 . From our metaphor-theoretic perspective, we should note how frequently activity in general is metaphorically referred to by Sources of competition and aggression. In Metalude, DEVELOPMENT/SUCCESS IS MOVEMENT FORWARD (advance, progress, leap, go a long way) grows into the more competitive ACTIVITY/COMPETITION IS A RACE (in the running, quick/slow off the mark, jump the gun, the favorite, jockey for position, make the running, outdistance etc.). And there is a very prolific set of metaphor themes in English that construct activity as competition: ACTIVITY IS GAME (player, opponent, team, beat (chopper, weapon, shoot your load, lady-killer, hit on, conquest, etc.) . It is likely that these extremely widespread and frequent metaphors have influenced or at least reinforced the theories in Table 1 . Laland and Brown, 2002, p. 302) For example, the sociobiologist Trivers uses economists' mathematical models of game theory to argue that reciprocal altruism evolved to reap the benefits of altruistic exchanges and moralistic aggression evolved to punish cheaters (Laland & Brown, 2002, pp. 84, 85 race because it preserved weaklings (quoted in Ryan, 2002, p. 37) . Herbert
Spencer ruled out welfare, since eliminating "unfit" individuals would benefit the human race (Ryan, 2002, p. 35) . Madison Grant in The passing of the great race (1916), read in translation by Hitler (Ryan, 2002, p. 46) , advocated the sterilization of social failures "beginning always with the criminal, the diseased, and the insane, and extending gradually to types which may be called weaklings rather than defectives, and perhaps ultimately to worthless race types" (Marks, 2002, p. 286) .
Eugenics obviously got a bad name in the mid-twentieth century, but the present possibility of genetic modification or engineering has given it a new impetus. "The horizons of the new eugenics are, in principle, boundless. For the first time in all time, a living creature understands its origin and can undertake to design its future" (Midgeley, 1998, p. 56) . This kind of eugenics ultimately derives from the notion that humans are simply highly evolved animals.
According to Dawkins' The selfish gene (1990) human behavior can be explained by the drive to pass on our genes, and this explains why we favor relatives, with whom we share more genes, over others who share less genetic material. "If you accept that evolution is all about selfish genes, the group has no role to play. Survival of the fittest means survival of the fittest DNA. There is no such thing as society." (Lynn Dicks, quoted in Ryan, 2002, p. 242 ).
Animals Are More or Less Humans
Selfish gene theory quite clearly links to the economic and political philosophies of Reaganism-Thatcherism 2 . Since animals only look after their own genesthemselves and those closely related to them, and since we are simply sophisticated and adaptable animals, the theory leads us to the conclusion: "There's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families" (Thatcher, 2002, p. 426) . This belief led Thatcher to attempt to abolish the "nanny state"; nannies are not related to us, and therefore make unnatural
The links between selfish-gene theory and Thatcherite economics is just one example of a subconscious tendency to reverse the equation or metaphor so that animals are viewed through the lens of human society. Max Black (1962) claims in his interaction theory that metaphor involves a two-way transfer, not only from Source to Target, but also from Target because they can then argue that it is natural for humans to behave in this way. The danger might be, of course, that this leads to an abdication of responsibility for ultra-competitiveness, violence and war.
Human as More or Less Animal-But Co-Operative and Symbiotic
Most of the theories mentioned above stress the competitive struggle for survival. However, one interesting challenge to the Darwinian account of social Darwinism is therefore a source or worry to many scientists, philosophers, and sociologists. (Ryan, 2002, p. 6) Most important for evolutionary theory is endosymbiosis, where one organism lives inside another or becomes part of it. This was essential to plant evolution.
In the early stages of plant life on earth an amoeboid protist was infected by or ingested a cyanobacterium-the ingestion or infection failed and a new endosymbiosis took place which incorporated the cyanobacterium as a chloroplast, leading to the forerunner of all plant cells-the green alga. (Ryan, 2002, p. 147) The contribution of symbiosis to plant and animal life and their evolution is enormous. Since the only living organism that can feed without relying on other organisms to pre-process its food is the bacterium "all life must ultimately depend on the prior existence and continuing presence of . . . autotrophic bacteria" (Ryan, 2002, p. 68 ). The result is that "every herbivore . . . could have evolved only in symbiotic partnership with its gut-based internal zoo of cellulose-degrading microbes" (Ryan, p. 167) .
The crucial point about some kinds of endosymbiosis is that they can transfer genetic material from one organism to another. For instance, in 2001 scientists at the Pasteur Institute discovered that resistance to the drug streptomycin had been transferred from one plague bacillus to another through the mediation of a mobile genetic unit, or plasmid (Ryan, 2002, p. 141 ).
Recognition of endosymbiosis as a mechanism of genetic transfer, demands reassessment of traditional evolutionary theory. Unlike natural selection, which acts on gene mutations to modify existing genes over a long period, formative symbiotic unions can merge together thousands of genes into a new hybrid organism very quickly. And the creative force of these symbiotic mergings is one which leads towards ever more biological and genetic complexity, a complexity not predicted by natural selection (Ryan, 2002, p. 92 ).
The complexity also involves increasing interdependence. In a sense, the boundaries between classes of organisms become blurred. "The interdependence of organisms in symbiotic associations . . . blurred the boundaries of taxonomic definition: where did the individual organism begin and end if genetic material could arrive from beyond the cell walls and change an organism's heredity?" (Ryan, 2002, p. 82) . Sorin Sonea (1983) has suggested that the individual kinds of bacteria can be thought of as the cells of a "global superorganism", which has evolved over years of fluid symbiotic relationships.
Ryan (2002) If, adopting the naturalistic fallacy, we wish to draw conclusions from this retort to neo-Darwinism, the Grounds of comparison (metaphor) or classification (hyponymy) become rather different from those in the Darwinian theories.
We are not simply programmed by our animal inheritance to participate in an aggressive struggle for existence, but are weighted towards symbiotic co-operation, not only between ourselves and others in society, but between ourselves and the rest of the living and non-living universe.
Humans May Be in Many Respects like Animals, but Ideally Are Different
There is a long tradition, in Western philosophy and cosmology, of regarding animals as inferior to humans. The classical and medieval view is well summed up by Tillyard in The Elizabethan world picture (1959) ( Table 2) . Topmost in the hierarchy were purely spiritual beings, God and the angels. Just below them, and in an ambiguous situation, were humans, partly spiritual and partly animal. They had the free will to choose between these two natures, and the main feature distinguishing them from animals was their ability to use reason to control their will. By foregoing reason and abandoning themselves to irrational emotion, they would become like animals, and descend in the hierarchy (Lakoff & Turner, 1989) . The idea of the superiority of humans over animals was boosted by Lamarckian views of evolution, in which later forms were thought superior.
Each species could then move up the 'chain of being', which culminated in human beings. . . . Lamarck's view of evolution was linear and progressive, with species having an inherent striving to evolve greater complexity, with the pinnacle of creation being human beings. (Laland & Brown, 2002, p. 40 ).
Darwin, too, is constantly using the word "improvement" to talk about natural selection and readily adopted Spencer's phrase "the survival of the fittest".
The biologist Romanes, in 1882, made an interesting comparison between phylogenetic development, the evolutionary development of life forms, and ontogenetic development, the development of the individual human during the early stages of its life, as shown in Table 3 : beef-complain and protest vigorously and persistently.
HUMAN IS SHEEP: sheep-unthinking imitator or over obedient person;
black sheep-someone who brings shame to a family; mutton dressed as lamb-older woman trying to look young; bleat-complain; pull the wool over someone's eyes-deceive someone by giving false information.
HUMAN IS MONKEY: monkey-mischievous or badly-behaved child; monkey around with-play or interfere with irresponsibly; monkey businessdishonest or bad behavior; make a monkey out of-make appear foolish; ape-stupid, awkward person; go ape-behave in an uncontrolled fashion; gorilla-rough and violent man.
HUMAN IS DOG: dog-unpleasant untrustworthy person; dog in the manger-person who prevents others enjoying things they don't want themselves; in the doghouse-suffering from disapproval or rebuke; bitchunpleasant, unkind woman; cur-worthless, cowardly man; puppy loveimmature love; fox-clever, cunning, and secretive person; vixen-unpleasant woman; outfox-be more cunning than; wolf-sexually predatory man; wolf down-eat greedily; wolfish-sinister or threatening (of a man); a wolf in sheep's clothing-deceitful and cunning person; poodle-someone too willing to support or be controlled by others; hound-follow someone menacingly to obtain something; bark-speak or give orders loudly and roughly; baydemand greedily; yap-talk continuously and annoyingly.
HUMAN IS CAT: alley-cat-prostitute or slut; cat-spiteful or backbiting woman; catty-spiteful; cat-burglar-thief who climbs silently to rob houses; copycat-imitator lacking originality; fat cat-greedy and wealthy person; man-eater-promiscuous woman with large sexual appetite; have kittensget worried or upset; pussyfoot-behave indecisively; wildcat-unofficial, risky.
HUMAN IS HORSE: horsy-with an ugly face like a horse (of women); horse around-behave noisily and stupidly; horseplay-rough, noisy behavior; ass-stupid person; coltish-young, energetic, and awkward; dark horsesomeone who keeps secrets, especially their own surprising ability; donkeysilly, stupid person; donkey-work-hard, boring part of a job; mule-carrier of illegal drugs; mulish-stubborn. The negative emotional slant of these metaphors reinforces the ideology of human superiority and disdain for animals, making it very difficult for us to conceive of animals and humans as having equal rights to exist, or for animals to be worth our sympathy. (We note, incidentally, the tendency for the sex specific pejorative metaphors to apply to females).
HUMAN IS PIG
To elaborate the latter point, Ekman has noted the widespread strategy to distance one racial or ethnic group which is being made to suffer by referring to them as animals: "Sometimes a person or a group of people-the Bosnian Muslims, the Jews, the American Indians, the African slaves, the Gypsiesmay be regarded as not being really human, not like the rest of us. They may be called animals, to show how little they matter, as a defence against sympathy" (Ekman, 2000, p. 91) . Charles Kingsley called the Irish "white chimpanzees" (Marks, 2002, pp. 69-70) .
Human Is in Some/Few Respects like an Animal
A poem by Edwin Muir (1965) But these have never trod
Twice the familiar track, Never, never turned back Into the memoried day.
All is new and near
In the great unchanging Here
Of the fifth great day of God, That shall remain the same,
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Never shall pass away.
On the sixth day we came.
This poem is relevant in two ways. First, that language is probably the most important ability that distinguished humans from animals. And second, that the world and history are created in our minds by human language, and do not have an existence that we can access except through language. The upshot of this is that people will classify and thereby create experience in various ways, according to their particular interests and cultural and linguistic inheritance. Human classification through language is not value-free, indeed categorization (kategorein meant 'to accuse' in ancient Greek) is a function of power. For example, Linnaeus, one of the great early "scientific" classifiers, favored breast-feeding by mothers and was against wet-nursing, and so chose the possession of milk-producing breasts as the criterion for his classmammalia. He also had the problem of deciding on how to classify apes and humans-apes are very much like us and very much unlike us simultaneously. Traditionally in zoology, humans are classified as hominoidiae along with great apes (chimps, gorillas, and orang-utans). The bases for this classification are teeth, lack of tail, position, mobility of the shoulder, and structure of the trunk. But difference from the apes could have been emphasized: We have two hands rather than four. We have a mental life which is quite distinct that has led to, among other things, technology, the ability to imagine-even to the extent of weeping over fictions-and, of course the development of and dependence on language and discourse (Marks, 2002, pp. 21, 22) . And it is language that is the necessary means of cultural elaboration and transmission. While there have been attempts to teach chimpanzees and bonobos to use sign language, with some success at the level of individual signs, the syntax they have acquired is extremely limited.
In The construction of social reality the philosopher John Searle (1995, p. 228) suggested that there is a more or less "continuous story that goes from an ontology of biology to an ontology of culture." However, he suggests that the brute facts of nature can be distinguished from the institutional facts of culture and that central to this is the institution of language. Language allows us to impose on brute physical entities, such as sounds or marks on paper, a symbolic function. And language is essential for constructing all other institutional facts such as money, marriage, government, and universities. Language creates culture.
The recent trend is to bolster the hominoidiae classification by recourse to figures about the amount of DNA shared. But as Marks (2002) We are, after all, at least 50% water! If we are similar but distinguishable from a gorilla ecologically, demographically, anatomically, mentally-indeed in every way except genetically-does it follow that all the other standards of comparison are irrelevant and the genetic comparison is transcendent? (Marks, 2002, p. 191) Not only are we distinct mentally and culturally from other members of the class hominoidiae, but according to Mithen (2003) , remarkably distinct from the other members of the homo genus.
All members of homo-other than H. sapiens-had domain-specific mentalities, the most advanced appearing in the Neanderthals. Homo sapiens, however, had the capacity to make mental links. Not only could they combine different types of knowledge, but they also had the capacity to think in metaphor-a capacity that underlies the whole of science, art and religion . . . ings and mathematical symbols. For Mithen we have taken a huge leap beyond our biology, and our use of metaphor underlines the fact that HUMAN IS ANIMAL is no more than a metaphor, in which there are minor Grounds of comparison. Mithen reminds us that among the major shapers of the mind are the metaphor themes by which we think.
According to some commentators and historians, the whole movement known as social reconstructionism has been seen as an attempt to distance humans from their biology.
What the available evidence does seem to show is that ideology, or a philosophical belief that the world could be a freer and more just place played a large part in the shift from biology to culture. . . . The main impetus came from the will to establish a social order in which innate and immutable forces of biology played no role in accounting for the behavior of social groups. (Degler, 1991, p. viii) Fromm (1983) also argues that one of the two crucial factors in the human evolution and human nature, besides the size of the brain, was the "ever decreasing determination of behavior by instincts" (p. 122). In addition, Fromm also relates this to the development of religion.
Lacking the capacity to act by the command of instincts while possessing the capacity for self-awareness, reason, and imagination-new qualities that go beyond the capacity for instrumental thinking of even the cleverest primates-the human species needed a frame of orientation and an object of devotion in order to survive. (p. 123)
Summary and Conclusion
The question we addressed in this article was to what extent HUMAN IS ANIMAL is a statement of hyponymy ('a human is a kind of animal') or a near identity statement ('humans are more or less animals'), or whether it is a metaphor of some kind ('humans are like animals'), and if the latter, what the Grounds of comparison are and how extensive they are (Table 4) . We have ranged over theories in socio-biology that largely stress the identity statement or hyponymy, regarding what distinguishes us from animals as insignificant, to theories that, while debunking the criterion of the percent-age of DNA shared (Marks, 2002) , stress our difference from our biological ancestors due to the development of symbols, including language and metaphor and institutions (Searle, 1995; Mithen, 2003) We have noted a prescriptive, rather than descriptive, tendency in many of the theories and discussions. The most common animal metaphors for humans are pejorative, suggesting that it is desirable to distance ourselves from animals, both conceptually and emotionally. But those arguing from an opposite direction, espousing the naturalistic fallacy, suggest that it is pointless to appeal to cultural or religious values for which there is no instinctual basis.
In terms of our practical behavior toward animals, we may also note that there is no necessary correlation between regarding animals and humans as quite different and the mistreatment of animals. According to biocentrism, any form of life has an intrinsic worth equal to any of the others. We could emulate the Burmese attitude to animals as described by H. Fielding Hall (1920), quoted in Schumacher (1999):
To him men are men and animals are animals, and men are far the higher.
But he does not deduce from this that man's superiority gives him the permission to ill-treat or kill animals. It is just the reverse. It is because man is so much higher that he can and must observe towards animals the very greatest care, feel for them the very greatest compassion, be good to them in every way he can. (p. 86)
We can perhaps re-look at the question of animal metaphors in a slightly different way. Even scientists who claim some kind of objectivity for their discipline are actually driven by the value-laden metaphors that they use for nature. Man then becomes a Source for animal Targets rather than viceversa, as we saw in the case of Darwin using English bourgeois society with its division of labor, entrepreneurism and competition for resources as a Source for the animal/plant Target, and Pinker (2003) seeing the U.S.
Constitution as a model for biological behavior. This is a way of making aspects of human society seem natural, as they are shared by animals, and serves the interests of those wielding power in such societies. Harvey (1996) points out, We see in short only those values which our value-laden metaphors allow us to see in our study of the natural world. Harmony and equilibrium;
beauty, integrity and stability; co-operation and mutual aid; ugliness and violence; hierarchy and order; competition and the struggle for existence; turbulence and unpredictable dynamic change; atomistic causation; dialectics and principles of complementarity; chaos and disorder; fractals and strange attractors; all of them can be identified as "natural values" not because they are arbitrarily assigned to nature, but because however ruthless, pristine and rigorously "objective" our method of enquiry may be, the framework of interpretation is given in the metaphor rather than the evidence.
(p. 163)
Indeed Kuhn (1993) and Pylyshyn (1993) in slightly different terms, point out that scientific models work as metaphors predicting various hypotheses or
Grounds that may then be tested. The program of research is driven by the metaphor, and different metaphors will highlight or predict different attrib- 
